While audit records indicate that the RPD has approximately 29 cameras that it pays for and operates directly (source), private organizations can share data from their Flock networks with the RPD. There are hundreds of these cameras in Raleigh (Source). Local businesses, such as Lowes Home Improvement and for profit Healthcare facilities, have their own Flock Surveillance systems and can opt-in to share data with the RPD.

With that, how many cameras within the City of Raleigh can the RPD access data from?

While audit records indicate that former employees remain listed as active users, Chief Boyce stated on August 18 that former staff cannot access the system because login requires a RPD email address, and employee access is revoked upon separation. (source)

1. The Flock Safety System only required 2 factor authentication (2fa) after August 1, 2026. How long RPD has been utilizing multifactor authentication for accessing the flock system? Did RPD have 2fa turned on since the beginning of their use of the platform?

2. Has it been verified that no former employees have conducted searches within the system post-separation?

3. Because third-party systems are usually decoupled from internal email services, losing access to an RPD email account may not automatically block access to the Flock System. Has it been confirmed that email-based two-factor authentication is enforced for all logins, and do RPD administrative controls prevent mail forwarding or account linking after employee offboarding?

Police Chief Boyce conceded that reason codes were not provided, in apparent violation of NCGS 132-1.4, but stated, “but the actual entry itself was a legitimate, lawful reason to run that tag.” (source)

1. Were all searches actually verified as legitimate or was Chief Boyce making a broad characterization? The audits suggest this may not be that case. For example, one audit indicated almost two dozen searches had no clear justification, stating this [upon retroactively inferring law enforcement purpose would clear up most of the improper codes, but] "would lower the incorrect coding to 22 searches." (source)

Reason codes serve as the primary audit mechanism for police officers, and NC State Statute explicitly identifies them so they can be subjected to external review. Why have public records requests regarding reason codes or their usage been denied, given that these requests specifically clarified that no personally identifiable information or protected internal affairs information was being sought?

Why do over 400 officers have access to the Flock Surveillance System? Would it be sensible to limit access or design the system such that patrol officers can receive alerts but only supervisors are allowed to search the system?

Would it be possible to retain a log of all searches? This log should be accessible by members of the City Council upon request.

According to Section 7.2 of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between RPD and NCSBI signed in March 2025 (see attached), the RPD was required to provide a report to the NCSBI ALPR Coordinator by March 1, 2026. Public records request claim that “no such report exists.” Why isn’t this report being filed?

Has the RPD ever investigated misuse of the Flock System? Has the Raleigh Police Department ever communicated with the NCSBI ALPR Coordinator regarding citizen complaints or significant violations of the agreement, as mandated by Section 7.10 of the MOU?  If so, why are public requests about these communications being denied?